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HELENA LOPES
The (De)Politicisation of Work  
– An Inquiry into the Political Function of Work*
The paper revisits the debate on the political function of work, defined as the con‑
tribution of work to the production and transformation of social relations, in both 
conceptual and empirical terms. It begins by briefly recalling the terms of the debate 
about the emancipatory potential of work as seen by Karl Marx and Hannah Arendt, and 
then proceeds to argue, contra Arendt, that since work is a collective and cooperative 
activity, it is not a ‑political. The major contribution of the paper consists of discuss‑
ing the issue by critically considering the literature on both economic theories of the 
firm and labour economics, two strands of literature usually kept apart. We regard the 
quantification and individualisation trends that characterise the contemporary world 
of work as a de ‑politicisation process, one linked to the (mainstream) agency theory of 
the firm which legitimises financialisation. We conclude by outlining a way in which to 
re ‑politicise work and the firm.
Keywords: business management; politicisation; social relations; wage; work.
Une société se juge au sort qu’elle réserve au travail
SIMONE WEIL
Introduction
The debate about the political function of work opened with Karl Marx’s 
claim that the consciousness -raising capacity of wage labour would result 
in emancipation through collective action. Hannah Arendt (1958) denied 
such potential, contending that work/labour is an essentially instrumental, 
and thus an a -political, activity. Marx’s and Arendt’s claims were based on 
quite divergent conceptions of the activity of work. Whereas the type of 
* A first version of this paper was presented as a keynote at the First Annual Meeting of the 
Portuguese Association of Political Economy under the title “A Substantive Conception of Work 
and the Firm – Institutional Implications”. Although the issue addressed in the present paper is 
different, its elaboration rests on the arguments previously developed.
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work Marx had in mind was craft work, which is meaningful and exhibits 
individuality, Arendt was very influenced by the Tayloristic modes of work 
organisation which, she argued, makes no room for individuality and iden-
tity. Thus, Arendt and other critical theorists expressly dismissed the idea 
that work can have any emancipatory potential since it would not allow for 
any type of consciousness. Our discussion of the political function of work 
is concentrated on seeing it as the contribution of work to the production 
and transformation of social relations (Cukier, 2017). 
Our argument proceeds as follows: we begin by briefly recalling the terms 
of the debate about the emancipatory potential of work. We emphasise 
that the conceptual discussion is closely connected with the forms that 
work content and work organisation have taken historically. The advent 
of Taylorism was accompanied by a neutralisation of the concept of work 
and the dismantling in social philosophy of the emancipatory status of the 
nineteenth -century concept of work (Honneth, 1982) (Section One). 
Section Two argues – contra Arendt and following, inter alia, Cukier 
(2017), Lopes (2016a), Fischbach (2015) and Dejours (2009) – that work, 
namely wage work, is not a -political and solely instrumental because it always 
involves a social, collective dimension. Production in firms is always a col-
lective endeavour, which requires workers to cooperate, i.e. to consent to 
doing their part of the collective venture. Explaining this consent requires 
breaking with the view that regards behaviour at work as driven exclusively 
by instrumental incentives and with Arendt’s view that considers work/labour as 
activities in which workers are undifferentiated bodies. We explain workers’ 
cooperation by the behavioural norms that emerge from the interpersonal 
interactions into which they enter to perform their work. These behavioural 
norms are generated by sympathy, a human capacity insightfully elaborated 
upon by Adam Smith (2017 [1759]). The extent to which sympathy is pro-
moted versus undermined by a given type of work organisation is assigned 
a critical role in our analysis of the political function of work.
In our view, discussing the political function of work demands that the 
firm be included in the analysis, something rarely done in economics, where 
the literature on the firm is maintained separate from labour economics. 
In fact, mainstream labour economics is centred on the analysis of the labour 
market and the activity of work is only addresses indirectly, in person-
nel economics and behavioural agency models. Additionally, since one 
cannot think about work without considering the forms it takes empirically, 
and since it is firms that determine such forms, it is fitting and appropriate to 
consider the modes that firm governance take, and what prompts such modes. 
Accordingly, Section Three focuses on the agency theory of the firm, a theory 
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that presently exerts powerful influence on how firms are governed and 
the forms that work takes. In particular, agency theory denies the political 
nature of firms (Singer, 2019).
Section Four examines the key trends that characterise the contemporary 
world of work, namely the individualisation and quantification processes. 
It is argued that the latter epitomise a powerful de -politicisation of work. 
The individualisation, quantification and ultimately de -politicisation of 
work is generated by the “government of work by numbers” (Supiot, 
2015), a set of management practices that now pervades all types of work 
organisations. We argue that these practices lead to the undermining 
of sympathy/solidarity in work organisations and to the promotion of a 
homo economicus type of behaviour, which explains the workers’ lack of 
resistance and disposition for collective action. Work is not a -political 
because workers’ individuality is not recognised, as professed by Arendt; 
it is de -politicised because it leads workers to focus on their individuality.
Section Five outlines a way to re -politicise work and the firm, namely 
through having workers participate in decision -making by generalizing the 
codetermination mode of firm governance. The last section offers conclud-
ing statements.
1. The Debate about the Emancipatory Potential of Work
The richness of Marx’s conception of work is worthy of particular note. 
Firstly, following Hegel, Marx views work as one constitutive aspect of 
self -consciousness; through work individuals actualise their cognitive capa-
bilities and engage in a process of intellectual self -development (Honneth, 
1982). Marx sees work primarily as an active processing of nature, specific 
to human beings, which, along with being a factor of production, also 
generates a process of personal development. The capitalist organisation 
of labour undermines this meaning -dimension of work because it abstracts 
the worker from the objectifying character of the activity of work; this is 
why wage labour is alienating.
Secondly, world history is defined as the self -recreation and self-
-emancipation of society, a process in which work plays a major role. 
Marx apprehends this process through the concept of social labour which, 
on the one hand, designates the technical form of reproduction of human 
existence and related social organisation of work, and, on the other hand, 
is assigned with the function of a social learning process in which workers 
become aware of the fact that their capabilities and needs are constrained 
by the given social structure (ibidem). The process of social labour thus 
releases emancipatory perspectives that lay the ground for social revolution.
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Thus, contrary to many subsequent interpretations that see the social 
learning and emancipatory processes as ones (to be) primarily carried out 
by a social class – a supra -individual entity – Marx also assigns a subjective, 
individual emancipatory potential to work activity. It is this individual -level 
attribute of (contextually embedded) work that then translates into collec-
tive action. We would also like to highlight that Hegel pointed out that the 
potential for emancipation lies in the interdependency that characterises 
(the division of) work. It is because each individual is aware of his/her 
dependence on others’ work for the satisfaction of his/her needs that he/she 
comes to transcend his/her individuality and espouses a universal attitude 
and associate reciprocity and mutual recognition norms (Fischbach, 2015).
Most twentieth -century social philosophers dismiss Marx’s link between 
work and emancipation, assigning emancipation to other kinds of activity. 
Some go so far as to completely invert Marx’s claims: workers no longer find 
in social labour the source of their potential power; instead, they see in it the 
power of the system and their own non -power (Gorz, in Fischbach, 2015). 
Since Hannah Arendt is one of the leading disputers of Marx’s emancipation 
contentions, our discussion builds on a critical analysis of Arendt’s concep-
tion of work in The Human Condition. Her basic argument is, following 
Aristotle, that in the activity of work/labour, there is neither an ethical 
dimension nor normative potential because no intersubjectivity is involved. 
Arendt (1958) distinguishes three forms of human activity: labour, work 
and action. Labour designates the repetitive and never -ending activities in 
which humans must engage to sustain the physiological requirements of life; 
individuals as labourers are bound to necessity. Work designates the activi-
ties through which humans transform the physical world in which they live. 
Finally, action refers to the activities involved in our living together; action 
is driven by the need to organise our living together and to have a good 
(in ethical terms) and meaningful life. In labour and in work, individu-
als relate only with nature and not with each other; work and labour are 
essentially non -social activities (this is why, given the purpose of the present 
paper, we hereafter only use the term “work”). Conversely, a key feature of 
action is that it does not take place in isolation from others.
Laboring is an activity in which man is neither together with the world nor with 
other people, but alone with his body, facing the naked necessity to keep himself 
alive. […] It is indeed in the nature of laboring to bring men together in the form of a 
labor gang where any number of individuals ‘labor together as if they were one’. […] 
But this ‘collective nature of labor’, far from establishing a recognizable, identifiable, 
reality for each member of the labor gang, requires on the contrary the actual loss of 
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all awareness of individuality and identity. […] The sociability arising out of [labor] 
rests not on equality but on sameness. (Arendt, 1958: 212 -213) 
In the realm of labour and work, human beings are tied to materiality 
and fabricate ‘the man -made -world’ in solitude. By contrast, emancipation 
is possible only through “action” (political activity in Arendt’s theoretical 
framework), an activity that goes on directly between individuals without the 
intermediary of things, which enables individuals to disclose ‘who’ they are. 
Only through “action”, i.e. through interacting with others through words 
and deeds, can individuals reveal their individuality and display their virtue 
and character. “Action refers specifically and exclusively to the activities 
involved in our living together; it excludes ‘everything merely necessary 
or useful’, that is, labour and work” (Lopes, 2016a: 9). Arendt seems to 
consider work a -political because she views work as merely instrumental 
and, importantly, because she considers that although work is a collective 
venture, there is no cooperation as such in the activity of work. That is, 
working with others does not involve interpersonal interactions, the kind 
of interactions that engage workers’ individuality and allow them to display 
their virtues and character.
Marx’s conception of work was very much influenced by the constellation 
of work forms of his time: the coexistence of meaningful, self -regulated craft 
work with the atomised, industrial division of work. It is craft work that 
led him and Hegel to consider that work can be a process of constructive 
objectification, a consideration difficult to hold in the face of mass produc-
tion which divided the complete work procedure into partial and atomised 
operations controlled by the rhythm of machines. For Honneth (1982), 
Arendt’s conception of work is overly linked to the forms that work took 
during the historical stage of Taylorism. 
2. Acknowledging the Collective and Cooperative Character of Wage Work 
– Crucial Implications
Arendt expressly states that work is an “antipolitical way of life” (Arendt, 
1958: 212) because, as mentioned, she assumes that in work human beings 
do not relate as unique and distinct persons. For her, it is only through action 
that individuals can distinguish themselves as distinct beings; that is, only 
action makes people political beings. Her argument is entirely grounded on 
the fact that she sees the “collective nature of labor” as a purely technical mat-
ter, one taking place between unidentifiable, undifferentiated individuals, 
i.e. a process that does not involve cooperation. Indeed, cooperating means 
operating in common, participating in a collective productive endeavour, 
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which implies pursuing a common goal. In fact, most productive activities 
require a high level of interdependence between workers; the workers 
must together develop a common understanding of the problems to be 
solved and how this can be done. Most importantly, cooperation implies 
committing to the behaviours agreed upon with the other members of the 
organisation, which entails giving up on one’s possible desire to free -ride 
on cooperative partners. 
Participating in a collective productive endeavour involves engaging in 
interpersonal interactions, i.e. workers interact as particular individuals.1 
The collective and interpersonal dimensions of work are both discarded 
in mainstream economic models. Even in the models that introduce social 
and moral motives into utility functions, individuals are calculative rather 
than social and moral beings (Lopes, 2016b). For example, Dur et al. (2010) 
do call attention to the many benefits good relationships may yield to the 
firm and recognise that they may motivate workers more powerfully than 
pecuniary incentives; likewise, employees’ effort and employer’s benevo-
lent treatment of workers are modelled as reciprocal gifts that, though 
costly, appear as possibly efficient strategies (Non, 2012). Nevertheless, 
these human dispositions are considered social preferences, which are 
introduced into the individualistic ontological apparatus of rational choice 
theory; however, the latter only recognises cognitive, not affective ele-
ments (Sugden, 2005), which are the elements activated in interpersonal 
human interactions that account for cooperative behaviour (see below). 
In the same vein, cooperation is not viewed as an outcome of continued 
social interactions; i.e. a collective endeavour, but instead as a residual 
kind of behaviour: “voluntary cooperation is defined as the difference 
between actual and privately optimal effort” (Non, 2012: 322). The deci-
sion to cooperate is taken separately by each worker depending on his/her 
preferences rather than emerging from the fact that workers are engaged 
in a collective productive venture. Instead, we consider that cooperation 
stems from social interactions and that, as argued by Hodgson (2013), 
cooperating cannot be accounted for by introducing ad -hoc preferences 
into individualistic utility functions.
1 It must be noted that Marx (1867), like Arendt one century later, refers to cooperation as the 
mere juxtaposition of workers by capital; cooperation would thus involve no social interactions. 
Conversely, we argue that workers do interact as persons when working and do subjectively engage 
at work, as documented in studies on the psychodynamics of work, even when the engagement 
takes the negative form of withdrawal (Dejours, 2016, 2009). Of course, we acknowledge that 
cooperation is largely imposed by the firm, but our account of cooperation sees it as resulting from 
both bottom -up (making room for agency) and top -down (social structure) phenomena; institutions 
depend on individuals just as individuals are moulded by institutions.
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According to Adam Smith’s concept of sympathy (The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments, 1759), the interpersonal relations into which individuals enter 
generate affective states that help emerge and sustain norms of cooperation. 
Our claim is that this also occurs when individuals work together, which 
means that workers do relate with each other as distinct, unique, moral 
individuals. Smith’s basic psychological assumption is that individuals have 
a capacity to feel the experience of others imaginatively and so to share 
their pleasures and pains, this leads to a “correspondence of sentiments” 
between people. This correspondence of affective states is, in turn, the basis 
for judgments of approval or disapproval of both one’s own actions and 
those of others. The whole process thus involves both cognitive (judgmental) 
and affective elements. 
Sympathy, now most commonly referred to as empathy, has seen renewed 
interest among psychologists and neuroscientists since the 2000s. The ubiq-
uitous reference to Adam Smith is striking; it is as though not much has been 
discovered about the psychological processes underlying empathy other 
than their neurological – mirror neurons – or neurobiological – oxitocyn 
– substrates (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2005; Zak and Barraza, 2013, respec-
tively). Collective action, i.e. behaviours that are performed with others to 
meet a goal or reach a desired outcome, and empathy are driven by the same 
physiologic drivers – this is why neuroscientists regard empathy as promot-
ing cooperation (Zak and Barraza, 2013). Intersubjectivity is recognised 
as the ontological ground of the human condition (Gallese, 2008) and it 
is shown that individuals are often self -concerned and other -orientated at 
the same time (Bolino and Grant, 2016). 
Adam Smith was right: sympathy does appear to be the basis for moral 
behaviour and cooperation; it accounts for why workers do not usually 
free -ride on others’ efforts (which is, by contrast, the default behavioural 
assumption of mainstream economics). Workers, through the recurrent 
interactions they enter into while participating in collective production, 
tend to subscribe to the same behavioural norms (processes of affective 
dissonance and corresponding judgments of disapproval may, of course, 
lead to severe disruptive events and breaks in cooperation). 
The abilities required to sustain cooperation, namely, making promises 
and fulfilling commitments, are assigned exclusively to (political) action by 
Arendt (and Aristotle). But once we recognise that work is permeated 
by cooperative behaviour, it follows that the processes Arendt assigns to 
the political sphere can also take place in workplaces. The exercise of virtue 
is the motive underlying action in Arendt’s framework; virtue stems from 
humans’ ability to see things not only from their own point of view but also 
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from the perspective of those with whom they interact. This is what occurs 
when workers are embedded in a collective productive process, i.e. when 
they pursue a common goal. As pointed out by Zamagni (2018: 17 -19), the 
etymology of common is cum -munis, as opposed to im -munis which means 
without obligations; the common refers to the existence of an interpersonal 
sphere that brings with it obligations towards others.
A work collective is a set of persons plus the rules they build together; 
a working rule is always also a rule about how to live together. For Dejours 
(2016), cooperation involves deontic activity, i.e. the production of obli-
gations and ethical norms, and cooperation is at the core of the political 
function/potential of work. Deontic activity in work requires workers to 
speak about their work and to express and justify their point of view on 
work -related matters; it also requires them to listen to others’ views and con-
cerns.2 This is a deliberative activity, what is properly considered “action”, 
or political activity, by Arendt.
3. The Missing Link: The Conception of the Firm and Related Governance 
Form
In order for work to be emancipatory, it must, on the one hand, allow for 
class consciousness, as claimed by Marx, or at least it must allow workers to 
be aware of their being part of a collective, and, on the other hand, workers 
must be able to display their individuality and identity, as claimed by Arendt. 
Only then can work fulfill a positive political function by empowering wor-
kers to strive collectively for more democracy and to produce flourishing 
social relations. Whether contemporary work offers such scope depends 
on how it is designed and controlled (this is examined in the next section), 
which depends, in turn, on the prevailing management/governance practi-
ces, since the latter determine the former.
The decades after the Second World War were characterised by Fordism, 
a period in which a social pact was established between trade -unions and 
employers according to which workers benefitted from productivity gains 
(Boyer, 2005). This was the so -called managerial period where managers 
enjoyed relatively high discretion in determining the purposes of firms, 
namely growth and productivity increases as much as making profit 
(Favereau, 2018). An implicit alliance between managers and workers (taken 
as consumers) was established through collective bargaining, which resulted 
2 Dejours understands that the world of work is also made of manifold rivalries that often produce 
injustice and suffering. Acknowledging cooperation and deontic activity at work does not mean 
overlooking the domination and coextensive perverse processes generated by the hierarchical 
institutional context in which workers operate.
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in the development of internal labour markets. Although the counterpart 
was that managers had full control over work -related decisions – workers 
were deprived of any decision -making latitude and autonomy – a sense of 
collective was preserved through the protection afforded by internal labour 
markets and through influential workers’ collective representative bodies. 
Work was reduced to a quantified amount; a certain number of work hours 
was exchanged for a certain amount of money, which was bearable thanks 
to social and effective collective rights. The work per se (purpose, content, 
methods, schedule) that each worker had to perform was largely determined 
by managers, and this was subject to very little discussion.
This Fordist compromise was unilaterally revoked in the subsequent, 
present stage of financialisation (Boyer, 2005). Financialisation, in its macro-
-level facet, powerfully impacts industrial relations systems, hence greatly 
affecting the balance of power between employers and employees. But it is 
the financialisation process taking place at the firm level, a process theoreti-
cally grounded on and empirically furthered by the economic, mainstream, 
agency theory of the firm (Favereau, 2016), which in our view most impacts 
the emancipatory potential of work. 
Agency theory’s rationale was launched by Friedman (1970: 32-33) and he 
claims: i) that managers are “the agents of the individuals who own the cor-
porations”, namely shareholders,3 and consequently ii) that the purpose of 
firms and managers is to “make as much money as possible”, not to “render 
certain [social] services”. Friedman insists that managers must promote the 
interests of shareholders only, which is to make “money profit”, and that 
declaiming that firms should “provide employment, eliminate discrimina-
tion and avoid pollution” is “preaching pure and unadulterated socialism”. 
He hence expressly contends that it is not in the nature of firms to be politi-
cal or perform some political role. 
Friedman’s arguments were turned into an economic theory of the firm by 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) – agency theory – a theory taught to millions of 
students and executives in business schools around the world which became 
a powerful normative model (Goshal, 2005). Agency theory views the firm 
as a nexus of contracts rather than a social institution aimed at producing 
goods and services. In fact, for Jensen and Meckling (1976), the firm is a 
3 Friedman was making a critical mistake in assuming that shareholders own the firm. It is clear 
for legal scholars, in both common law and coded civil law, that shareholders only own their 
shares of the corporation, not the firm, which is an economic entity (deprived of legal status) that 
cannot be owned (Favereau, 2018; Robé, 2012). Remarkably, public opinion and most economists 
discard this crucial fact. Published in the New York Times given its significant impact and because 
it epitomised prevailing views at the time, Friedman’s paper is a major reference in the academic 
literature of economics, management and corporate law.
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means for finding optimal capital structure through minimizing debt financ-
ing costs; they accordingly focus on the relationship between shareholders as 
principals and managers as agents. The firm is formally reduced to a cascade 
of principal -agent contracts and the question of its governance is reduced 
to investigating which incentives best align the interests of each worker 
with those of the (supposed) owners of the firm. In this view, shareholders 
bear the greatest investment risk since their revenues depend on what is 
left after the contracts with other input providers are honoured. To protect 
their investments, they are given control over governance, i.e. over the board 
of directors (management). The maximisation of share -value then became 
the final criterion of the good governance of firms, and an explicit alliance 
between shareholders and managers was de facto established since the 1980s 
(Favereau, 2018; Boyer, 2005).
The view of the firm progressively changed from that of a centre of 
production and employment to that of a centre for the management of 
an assets’ portfolio, with huge consequences on its governance. In fact, 
agency theory became the dominant paradigm in corporate scholarship 
and corporate law in the 1990s (Armour, 2005): “both boardrooms and 
courts have taken the normative call for shareholder value maximisation 
increasingly at heart” (Bodie, 2012: 1033). In conformance with Friedman’s 
rationale, the “shareholder primacy” governance model, grounded on the 
principal/shareholders–agent/managers relationship, eschews employees 
(Bodie, 2012) and, indeed, the productive organisation itself. The firm, 
a productive entity composed of collectives of work, is transformed into a 
set of financial assets. This view partly explains why we are now witness-
ing a regression to forms of work prior to wage work (e.g. Uber and other 
forms of digital platform work), leaving workers without the legal and 
social protections associated with their integration into the firm.
4. The Contemporary World of Work: The Depoliticisation of Work
The financialisation of firms, promoted or at least legitimated by agency 
theory, has far -reaching effects on firm governance and on work. Managers’ 
scope of discretion is now much more limited than in the Fordist era – 
their decisions are greatly constrained by the (short -term) financial returns 
imposed by institutional investors. Besides, the rationale that now underlies 
their remuneration – an incentive structure designed to make them create 
“value” for shareholders – brought about a radical break with the former 
implicit alliance between managers and workers; top executives earned 
295 times more than a typical American worker’s wage in 2013 as com-
pared with the figure of 20 times more in 1965 (Davis and Mishel, 2014). 
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Financial objectives are now given priority over any other, and the quan-
tification of work, which did not begin with financialisation, extensively 
disseminated under financialisation.
The quantification of work process involves two phases: first, financial 
targets are translated into localised and quantified objectives for each opera-
tional level, each activity and each worker; second, what has been done 
at each operational level and in each activity is reported by workers and 
translated into financial values (Favereau, 2016). The set of practices that 
embodies this “governance of work by numbers” (Supiot, 2015) – namely, 
the quantification of work targets and of performance appraisals, the pecu-
niary incentive schemes, and systematic reporting – if particularly suited to 
the pursuit of shareholder value maximisation, came to pervade not only 
publicly listed and financialised firms but all types of work organisations, 
including public services (e.g. academia and health).
Governance by numbers focuses on the outcomes of work rather than 
the workers as persons, which contributes to eluding workers’ individuality 
in the eyes of managers; this is no historical novelty. What is new is that, 
by being based on numbers, this kind of governance is supposed to be 
axiologically neutral when in fact, since it overlooks the subjective and col-
lective experience of work, it is actually a highly axiological phenomenon. 
The process of work quantification, being intimately linked to that of the 
individualisation of work, amounts to dismiss, in practical management 
terms, the collective character of work.4 
The other novelty lies in the fact that workers’ individuality, though 
eluded, is now expressly and intensively mobilised (Lopes, 2016b). 
The individualisation of work is carried out not solely through practices 
like the setting of individualised (quantified) performance targets and 
individualised (quantified) appraisal systems but also through the creation 
of an illusionary autonomy. Indeed, being aware that workers’ loyalty and 
cooperative spirit are more efficiently fostered by granting them greater 
decision -making scope than submitting them to technical prescriptions and 
control, managers now often involve workers in the setting of the objec-
tives they are required to achieve and for which they are made accountable. 
Workers are also often free to decide on the means and methods to reach 
4 In truth, management practices are highly diversified; they intensely discriminate, in particular, 
between highly qualified “core” workers and low -qualified easily replaceable workers, as com-
prehensively shown by labour segmentation studies. Also, we do not deny that there are many firms 
that do acknowledge and duly compensate cooperation, but empirical evidence from sociological 
and critical management literature suggests that the quantification and individualisation trends 
are prevalent and tend to grow rather than disappear. 
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these objectives. The latter no longer look like prescriptions imposed from 
outside; rather, the workers feel like acting “freely”, driven by their own 
will and self -control, which makes them strive to give their best. In truth, 
this autonomy aims at getting them objectively accountable and subjectively 
involved, without affording them more choice and opportunities for self-
-direction. Most importantly, this false autonomy contributes to obscuring 
the workers’ sense of collective, promoting instead a competitive spirit.
Thus, many workers today do not perform some task because they 
were instructed to do so but because it is required to reach their targets. 
This is not Taylorism any longer (though Tayloristic work has certainly not 
disappeared); instead, self -control became key to the functioning of work 
organisations. Governance by numbers aims at establishing a self -regulated 
order (Supiot, 2015). In accordance with the firm -as -nexus -of -contracts 
view, firms would be inhabited by self -sufficient, separated workers driven 
by selfish utility calculus and the fear of losing their jobs. 
The quantification of the work process deeply affects the way work 
is experienced, with wide influence on workers’ values and behaviours. 
Governance by numbers is shown to prompt calculative and competitive 
behaviours by transforming the workers’ subjective perceptions of their 
work. For example, Alvehus and Spicer (2012) report that “billable hours”5 
practices lead workers to understand their work as a kind of investment that 
should be manipulated so as to reap maximal benefits, sometimes at the 
expense of colleagues who are lower in the hierarchy. Instead of experienc-
ing the quantification of their work as an oppressive form of control, workers 
come to see their work life as an investment which may pay dividends in the 
future. Many of them declare experiencing the tension between the feeling 
of being part of a collective and the pressure to participate in a competi-
tive game which often compels them to behave selfishly (if not opportun-
istically; see Alvehus and Spicer, 2012) to meet their quantified targets. 
This seriously deteriorates solidarity, which in turn undermines the condi-
tions and dispositions for collective action.
Such manipulation of the subjective and discarding of the collective 
dimensions of work results in the progressive disappearance of empathic 
concern from workplaces, replaced by feelings of isolation, suspicion and 
anomie – which are, unsurprisingly, the ontological basis of mainstream 
economics. What the quantification of work is actually fostering in many 
workplaces is what Brons (2017) denounces as “cultural psychopathy”, 
5 The number of hours worked is included in customers’ invoices. This is a practice that presently 
pervades many types of firms.
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namely the acceptance, or even approval, by some cultures that the indi-
vidual lack of empathy (sympathy in Smith’s terms) is normal rather than 
deviant (cultural psychopathy is different from psychopathy as an indi-
vidual pathology, though both may end up being related). Brons (ibidem) 
emphasises that psychopathy as a cultural phenomenon might be one of the 
most destructive forces for mankind since it destroys community; he also 
notes that it may be mainstream economics’ success in actually promoting6 
homo economicus that is contributing to promoting cultural psychopathy. 
The systems of values are being transformed by current management prac-
tices; workers become obsessed with their productivity, and their perceived 
self -worth now also depends on the “numbers” they make. Governance by 
numbers infuses neo -liberal governance and values into work, the activ-
ity that takes most of individuals’ time and energy. It accomplishes the 
“economisation of society” by extending homo economicus to all fields of 
society (Foucault, 2004).
The quantification and individualisation of work ultimately leads workers 
to perceive themselves as separated individuals rather than members of a 
collective, which is the condition for the mobilisation of collective resis- 
tance, as pointed out by Marx. Workers’ resistance presently takes rather 
individual forms – organisational disaffection, cynicism, work withdrawal 
– but many workers end up contributing to rather than resisting the gov-
ernance by numbers’ practices. The workers’ lack of resistance and relative 
disengagement from collective action worryingly signal that management 
practices are succeeding in spreading the individualistic values grounding 
neo -liberalism, which contributes to legitimise and “naturalising” them, 
in a vicious circle. Such legitimisation and naturalisation epitomise the 
de -politicisation of work. Indeed, governance by numbers deconstructs 
solidarities and mutual help at work. The novelty of present times is not 
that firms exploit workers’ engagement at work – this did not appear with 
financialisation – but that quantification and individualisation practices are 
increasingly considered and accepted by workers and citizens as reasonable 
and justified. This generalised acceptance attests that this state of affairs is 
not seen as the outcome of political choices. Yet, the conception of the firm, 
firm governance and work organisation are highly political issues (Singer, 
2019), notwithstanding Friedman’s claims.
To sum up, the quantification of work (i.e. neoliberal management 
practices) is depriving workers of their opportunities, and hence abilities, 
6 This is one instance of the performativity of mainstream economics, i.e. of its capacity to make real-
-world economic behaviour more like its description in economic theory (Santos and Rodrigues, 2009).
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for cooperation – which, as developed above, involves workers’ individuality, 
i.e. requires workers to “disclose who they are” to put it in Arendt’s terms. 
Management rhetoric and practices, despite appealing to and using workers’ 
individuality and subjective involvement (Lopes, 2016b), do not recognise 
them. To revert this, supposedly autonomous, and de facto accountable, 
workers should participate in the decisions that determine the goals they 
supposedly freely pursue.
5. Outlining a Solution to Re -Politicise Work and the Firm
The foregoing developments show that cooperation is at the core of the politi-
cal potential of work. Work can only be a means for a positive transforma-
tion of society if an institutional environment is implemented that allows for 
cooperation at work. This is so because cooperation calls for deontic activity. 
Instituting the conditions for cooperation would establish a continuity between 
“work, deontic activity and democracy” (Dejours, 2009). This requires that 
workers have substantial control over their work, which implies that they 
participate in firm decision -making instances.
The arguments developed in Sections Three and Four, which highlight 
the influence the conception and the governance of firms have in shaping the 
world of work, suggest that one cannot retrieve the emancipatory potential 
of work without a reflection on what a firm is. The inevitable first step is 
therefore to build a theory of the firm. Such a theory must be consistent 
with what real -world firms actually are: social structures aimed at producing 
goods or services efficiently enough to generate profits. The firm must be 
understood again as a centre of production and employment rather than a 
bundle of assets or a nexus of contracts. Rather than (human) assets whose 
contribution to financial performance is to be quantified, workers must 
be regarded as a constitutive party of the firm. We hence follow Favereau 
(2018) in seeing the firm as constituted by three parties: i) shareholders, 
who provide capital (but are not, as referred, the owners of the firm);7 
ii) the structured institutional arrangement required to carry out production, 
which is directed by managers; iii) workers, who supply work.
Management is in charge of organizing social and productive interde-
pendence; it is a technical and social necessity without which no collective 
would function. It incorporates the collective productive purpose, i.e. the 
interest common to the three parties. Shareholders do not participate in 
7 We are aware that the theory of the firm proposed here is a theory of corporate firms, which are 
but a tiny fraction of firms. However, this is the type of firms theorised in economics and, impor-
tantly, these firms’ management practices are taken as benchmarks and progressively diffuse to all 
type of work organisations.
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the productive process nor do they determine or direct work organisa-
tion. Workers are subordinate not to shareholders but to the collective of 
production, formed by themselves and their fellow members, a collective 
directed by management. It is important to analytically distinguish the three 
parties constituting a corporate firm because each party has goals that partly 
conflict with those of the others. Besides, acknowledging the three parties 
helps clarify and better understand the experience of work. 
The second step is to outline the firm governance mode that could 
establish, though tentatively, the conditions for cooperation and for work 
to fulfill its political function. Codetermination is one such governance 
mode; it is defined as the presence of employee representatives on boards, 
with the same rights as shareholders and at least one third of seats, plus 
the institution of work councils, composed of workers and managers, 
with decision rights on work organisation (Favereau, 2018).
Board -Level Employee Representation is common in Europe: in 11 coun- 
tries employee representatives comprise at least 1/3 of board members 
(7 other countries have fewer worker representatives); 36% of European 
workers are represented on the boards (Waddington and Conchon, 2016). 
But the codetermination (Mitbestimmung in Germany) mode of firm gover- 
nance only exists in Germany and Scandinavian countries. In these countries, 
employees hold at least one third of the seats on boards, which allows them 
to participate in strategic decisions (relocation, offshoring, employment 
policy), and this representation is complemented by powerful plant -level 
work councils (Betriebsrat), where workers participate in operational decisions 
(work organisation, working conditions) with managers.
Codetermination is a mode of firm governance that institutionally rec-
ognises that work collectives are the building blocks of firms. It acknowl-
edges that firms are constituted by three parties, which allows for placing 
the collective productive purpose, as opposed to shareholders’ interests, 
at the centre of firm governance. Codetermination assumes that there is 
a radical conflict of interests between labour and capital, and also that 
this conflict generates the need to organise coexistence institutionally. 
The importance of workplace work councils is critical: i) experience 
shows that the most crucial factor for the success of employee partici-
pation is that it is not driven by top -down processes but emerges from 
the collectives of work, and ii) it is the level at which cooperation takes 
place de facto. Whilst codetermination implies a weakening of the com-
mand and control structures, it does not eliminate managerial authority. 
For what is needed is not the absence of power but its democratisation 
(Lopes, forthcoming).
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After having thoroughly studied labour movements in the period after 
the Second World War, Trentin (2012) concludes that it is not private 
ownership that prevented workers’ emancipation but the “private” char-
acter of labour relations within firms. Since labour movements assumed 
that no emancipation is possible within capitalism, there was no real 
fight for workers’ control over work organisation at the workplaces;8 the 
hope for more democratised work was relegated to a distant future and 
a different type of society. However, it might be argued that workplaces 
are arenas where the disposition for political action is effectively culti-
vated. For Pateman (1970), direct participation at work is an essential 
element of democracy to the extent that it contributes to developing the 
qualities needed for responsible public action  – self -confidence, public-
-spiritedness, willingness to cooperate, which results in enhanced political 
participation. That is, the more control and influence individuals exercise 
over their work life, the better equipped and more inclined they are to par-
ticipate in community life (Lopes et al., 2014; Karasek and Theorell, 1990). 
For Pateman, in the absence of the vital training ground of low level 
participation, only few workers (certainly the most educated) would take 
up the opportunity offered in participative governance. For “society itself 
is produced and reproduced along the lines of relations found at work” 
(Cleghorn, 2007: 307). 
Codetermination, by instituting the participation of workers at both 
board level and workplace level would therefore definitely foster the politi-
cal function of work. However, Hyman (2016) points out that the present 
financialised stage of capitalism undermines codetermination: strategic 
decision -making is increasingly removed from the sphere of codetermina-
tion, the very identity of the employer is often obscure, and competitive 
advantage is given priority over the workers’ interests. This suggests that 
codetermination is an effective solution only if it is institutionally established 
in a sufficient number of closely related countries. In fact, during the 1970s, 
the Common Market country members discussed a project of European 
directive that would unify corporate law and generalise codetermination 
in European member states (Favereau, 2018). But in the 1980s, the neo-
liberal wave succeeded in imposing its vision of the world and of the firm, 
a vision that relegated codetermination to oblivion and disregard (also in 
8 Labour movements intensely and successfully fought for many issues, including the improvement 
of work conditions, but never really fought for more control of workers over work -related decisions 
within firms. Bargaining processes were supposed to take place between trade -unions and employers 
mostly outside of and at a higher level than the workplace.
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the academic world). Nonetheless, a very recent but pervasive interest in 
codetermination is now observed9 that gives some reasons for hope. 
Conclusion
This paper discusses the political function of work in both theoretical 
and empirical terms. It begins by briefly recalling that Karl Marx saw an 
emancipatory potential in work for two reasons: i) work is a means for self-
-development and ii) wage work creates the conditions for class conscious-
ness and consequently for the workers’ fight for emancipation. Conversely, 
Hannah Arendt considered work and labour as a -political activities, on the 
grounds that there is no room in work/labour for the workers’ individuality, 
which implies that emancipation is to be pursued through (political) action 
exclusively. Contra Arendt we argue that production in firms is a collective 
endeavour that calls for cooperation among workers. Cooperating involves 
entering into interpersonal interactions which activate sympathy and related 
“deontic activity” (Dejours, 2009), an activity that highly engages the work-
ers’ individuality.
We then defend that a comprehensive theoretical and empirical under-
standing of the political function of work calls for an examination not only 
of the concept and historical forms taken by work but also of the concep-
tion and historical forms taken by firms. We accordingly describe the 
(mainstream economics) agency theory of the firm, highlighting its role in 
the present financialisation process and how it transforms firm governance. 
The contemporary world of work, which is markedly shaped by firm -level 
financialisation processes, is then characterised by pervasive quantification 
and individualisation trends. These trends are embodied in a set of “gover- 
nance of work by numbers” (Supiot, 2015) practices that, on the one hand, 
destroy the collectives of work and related solidarity and, on the other hand, 
make workers focus on their productivity and the individualised targets 
they are required to meet. We regard these two phenomena as epitomizing 
a profound depoliticisation of work. 
If twentieth -century social philosophers renounced the belief in the 
emancipatory potential of work, it is now workers who are led to aban-
don their hope for emancipation in and through work, not because their 
individuality is not engaged in work but because they are led to solely 
concentrate on it.
9 In the academic world, the British Journal of Industrial Relations recently organised a workshop 
to Board -Level Employee Representation, and a special issue is forthcoming. In the US, the issue 
is discussed in political arenas (see Holmberg, 2019).
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We end by outlining a solution to re -politicise work and the firm, namely 
through the generalisation of the codetermination governance mode, 
which institutes workers’ participation in decisions at both board level and 
workplace level. This mode of firm governance recognises that work collec-
tives are the building blocks of firms and create the conditions for workers 
to develop their disposition for political action. Codetermination may be 
a way to reestablish the formation of collectives of work and consequently 
rehabilitate solidarity. Solidarity, which is a major benefit of cooperation, 
is the political side of sympathy/empathy; it is the greatest threat to neo-
liberalism because when individuals prefer being together than competing 
against each other, neoliberalism is at risk.
Edited by Scott M. Culp
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A (Des)Politização do Trabalho  
– Um Inquérito à Função Política  
do Trabalho 
Este artigo revisita o debate sobre a fun-
ção política do trabalho, definido como o 
contributo do trabalho para a produção e 
transformação de relações sociais, tanto 
em termos conceituais como em termos 
empíricos. Inicia -se com um breve relance 
dos termos do debate sobre o potencial 
emancipatório do trabalho, conforme 
perspetivado por Karl Marx e Hannah 
Arendt, argumentando de seguida, con-
tra Arendt que, como o trabalho é uma 
atividade coletiva e cooperativa, ele não é 
apolítico. O principal contributo do artigo 
consiste em discutir a questão através de 
uma abordagem crítica da literatura sobre 
as teorias económicas da empresa e sobre 
a economia do trabalho, duas vertentes da 
literatura geralmente mantidas separadas. 
Consideramos as tendências de quantifica-
ção e individualização que caracterizam o 
mundo do trabalho contemporâneo como 
um processo de despolitização, processo 
ligado à teoria da agência, uma teoria da 
empresa que legitima a financiarização. 
Concluímos delineando uma forma de 
repolitizar o trabalho e a empresa.
Palavras -chave: gestão empresarial; poli-
tização; relações sociais; salário; trabalho.
La (dé)politisation du travail  
– Une enquête sur la fonction 
politique du travail
Cet article revisite le débat sur la fonction 
politique du travail, définie comme une 
contribution du travail à la production et 
à la transformation de rapports sociaux, 
débat mené tant en termes conceptuels 
qu’en termes empiriques. Nous commen-
çons par brièvement rappeler les termes 
du débat sur le potentiel émancipatoire 
du travail, selon Karl Marx, potentiel que 
Hannah Arendt dénie. Contra Arendt, 
nous soutenons que, comme le travail 
est une activité collective et coopérative, 
il n’est pas apolitique. La principale contri-
bution de cet article est de débattre cette 
question à travers une approche critique de 
la littérature sur les théories économiques 
de l’entreprise et sur l’économie du tra-
vail, deux volets généralement maintenus 
séparés dans la littérature économique. 
Les tendances de quantification et d’indi-
vidualisation qui caractérisent le monde 
du travail contemporain constituent, selon 
nous, un processus de dépolitisation, 
processus lié à la théorie de l’agence de 
l’entreprise qui légitime la financiarisation. 
En guise de conclusion, nous traçons les 
pourtours de ce qui pourrait être une façon 
de repolitiser le travail et l’entreprise.
Mots -clés: gestion d’entreprise; politisa-
tion; relations sociales; salaire; travail.

